Page 38 - Security Today, March 2018

to snare a drone, but these technologies are yet not authorized by the FAA to be deployed at stadiums. Others try to hack or spoof the communication of a drone to gain control, but these approaches still fall in the same category as RF jamming interference and are restricted by the FCC.
Preparation
Because of the difficulty in preventing visits from these unwelcome guests, the planning and preparation for such an event becomes cru- cial. According to Jim Martin from Venue Intelligence, whose Play- book mobile app is used to plan and communicate event and safety procedures to diverse stakeholders at live events and large venues. Key steps that Martin increasingly sees implemented include:
• Understanding what, if any, approved drones will be utilized at the event. Have all appropriate contact information accessible for the organization/pilot, and have him/her credentialed and given a clear understanding of where and how the drone will be used. This step further allows you to reduce the number of “false alarms” by identifying those drones that are approved at your event. “This is an easy one to miss,” says Martin. “We see a number of events with drones hovering overhead and often just a single person or two that are aware of whether it’s authorized. It’s better to have more of your team aware then less, particularly as the public be- comes more aware of the potential risks.”
• Meeting with all the stakeholders and your security team to brain- storm how to respond to different threat postures that the drone may take. “The likelihood of a drone carrying a chemical or ex- plosive is still considered a low-probability (albeit, high impact) scenario. It’s more likely that an operator would lose control of a drone and crash it into the crowd or event itself. There should be some discussion around what to do if that were to occur.”
• Documenting the procedures and creating actionable expecta- tions of specific roles in reporting/addressing the situation, spe- cifically: looking for the pilot, taking a picture of the drone and/ or its pilot as you approach, if/ how dialogue, escalation options and reporting and/or texting information to the appropriate POC.
• Incorporating the new procedure into training events where all personnel are required to execute the plan of action, identify gaps and take action to fill those gaps.
• Effectively distributing the procedures and expectations to your personnel and all key stakeholders. “That was the catalyst for building the Playbook mobile app,” says Martin. “We want to le- verage all the viable stakeholders at an event or venue as a force multiplier, and increasingly that includes volunteers. So whether they want a quick refresher on their specific role, need to take a picture and text it to a POC or start a quick incident report, that option is on their phone and just a click or two away.”
• Gathering feedback via a hotwash/after-action meeting to capture any/all drone-related sightings or observations
Detection and Identification
After the number of nuisance drones have been reduced through pro- active messaging and a comprehensive plan has been established and communicated across your key stakeholders, the next step is detec- tion and identification.
Detection may be done by a number of different sensor technolo- gies including: acoustic, optical, radio sniffers and radar. Of these, radar is the most robust as it detects that actual moving target by transmitting radio waves that bounce off the drone to the radar and does not suffer from environmental effects like acoustic and optical sensors. Radio sniffers can also be quite effective if the radio used by the drone is one known and supported by the radio sniffer. Otherwise, the radio sniffer will not be able to properly detect that it is a drone.
However, if the drone is running silent by going to a location us- ing only GPS and no user input, then the radio sniffer will have no
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transmissions to detect. Within radar there are several different tech- nologies available, including large rotating or electronically scanned radar with ranges of 2km to 4km that cost in the millions. For ranges of up to 1km there is a smaller and much less expensive radar tech- nology called Compact Surveillance Radar (CSR) that is able to de- tect and pinpoint the GPS location of a drone to ranges of 1km and is suited for more complex urban environments.
Early detection of an approaching drone is key as it gives security personnel time to react before the drone is overhead. By detecting the drone far outside the perimeter, it is possible to train high resolution cameras onto the drone and evaluate the type of payload being car- ried. In the case of a drone simply carrying a video camera, then law enforcement may be informed and a search for the operator initiated. If the drone is carrying a large payload of what may be explosives or dangerous chemicals, then a more complicated response may be in order.
Response
So what does the FAA recommend as the course of action?
The FAA uses the DRONE acronym to help remind those in-
volved of the recommend procedures:
Direct Attention outward and upward, attempt to locate and
identify individuals operating the drone
Report Incident to the FAA Regional Operations Center Observe the drone and maintain visibility of the device
Notice features: identify the type of device
Execute appropriate police action
Martin indicated that a number of customers have used Playbook
to share this sort of directive with their volunteers, staff and vendors but even more importantly, are looking to use the Playbook platform and other mass notification systems to send discreet escalation mes- sages that shouldn’t go out over traditional radio.
Preparing for an Evacuation
In the case of a stadium or other large event venue, one of the main threats posed is the panic caused by the drone dropping suspicious looking objects or causing explosions. Even if a drone has been de- tected and identified carrying a suspicious payload, most stadium op- erators would not be inclined to order an evacuation. A drone carry- ing leaflets may look exactly the same as a drone carrying biological or chemical agents and while neither is desirable, the evacuation of a stadium for such a reason would undoubtedly result in a variety of significant, if not catastrophic outcomes. That is not to say precau- tions shouldn’t be taken.
In the case a suspicious drone, security staff and other associ- ated resources can be discreetly notified or messaged to prepare for a possible incident and evacuation, while the appropriate of- ficials continue to diagnose the drone’s intent. These actions could include: ensuring all exits and evacuation paths are noted and ac- cessible, readying stadium parking resources and confirming post- event traffic patterns/controls.
By simply walking through a series of precautionary steps and without taking any extreme measures, event staff can inconspicu- ously prepare the venue for a more efficient and effective response to a crisis.
In some cases, an evacuation is clearly warranted. The Depart- ment of Homeland Security has provided guidance in planning an evacuation at a stadium. This document describes
the structure, planning and testing of the plan for
numerous types of threats, which now includes
drones. Some organizations have even put togeth-
er public evacuation plans that are available to be
viewed on YouTube.
Logan Harris is the founder and CEO at SpotterRF.
0318 | SECURITY TODAY
DRONE SECURITY