Page 50 - FCW, July 2020

Ideas
5G: Promise and perils for agencies
The government must address concerns about 5G’s cybersecurity risks so that it can capitalize on the technology’s full potential
BY KATHERINE GRONBERG
Fifth-generation (5G) wireless technology has the potential to transform how the U.S. government achieves its many critical missions. With superior bandwidth, agencies will be able to connect more mission- supporting devices than ever. 5G also promises to increase the functionality of those devices through reduced latency and speeds that are up to 100 times faster than the current fourth- generation Long Term Evolution technology. This can translate into improved performance, security, safety and efficiency for federal missions.
Congress and the White House recognize how important it is that the U.S. fully harness the power of 5G in meeting government missions. The need for effective and efficient COVID-19 response and recovery has only highlighted that importance.
The U.S. military — the most logistically complex organization in the world — is likely to emerge as a leading 5G adopter and innovator. In the fiscal 2020 defense spending bill, Congress provided $275 million to the Defense Department for next-generation information communications technology, including 5G.
DOD is currently demonstrating the benefits of 5G in government in a few interesting projects, including testing the concept of a “smart warehouse” at the U.S. Naval Supply Systems
Command Fleet Logistics Center San Diego. The project will leverage 5G to manage inventory and process orders with optimal efficiency and accuracy. As DOD officials contemplate the wide range of possible use cases for 5G technology, their spending will align to those desired uses.
Maintaining control of security
To allow DOD and other federal agencies to realize 5G’s full potential, however, the government must address concerns about the technology and its cybersecurity risks. One of the widely discussed risks is the problem of potentially compromised hardware being incorporated into our national telecommunications infrastructure. Congress and the White House have taken steps to address this issue by calling for incorporating a microelectronic trusted supply chain and operational security standards into 5G equipment.
The government has also prohibited telecommunications providers that receive federal funding from using equipment produced by Huawei and ZTE, two manufacturers the U.S. government believes have ties to the Chinese Communist Party and therefore could potentially be compelled to install unauthorized remote access capabilities into their products. The concern that such backdoors could be exploited by
the Chinese government for espionage, sabotage or even acts of war is shared by many U.S. policymakers and experts on a bipartisan basis.
While much of the security discussion surrounding 5G has thus far focused on certain Chinese equipment manufacturers, there is another major security concern that must be addressed: the risk posed by millions of additional devices, including internet-of- things devices, accessing government network resources.
In the past, such devices have connected to network resources through U.S. government-managed wired or wireless access points on government-controlled campuses. By contrast, the 5G vision entails millions of devices accessing network resources remotely via cellular connections, likely provided through a blend of government and carrier-owned networks. Whose job is it to determine which of these devices are legitimate and do not pose a threat to either the carrier or the agency IT infrastructure they access? Who is responsible for monitoring devices while connected to ensure they don’t change their state or, in other words, present themselves as legitimate, secure devices but once admitted to the network proceed to engage in hacking or espionage activities?
And ultimately, how should this diverse landscape of devices and
46 July 2020 FCW.COM