Page 17 - FCW, August 2017
P. 17

BUG BOUNTY PROGRAMS:
CROWDSOURCED TROUBLESHOOTING
During the last year, the Defense Department has been doubling down on the idea of organizing
“bug bounty” contests. These involve inviting so-called white-hat hackers to probe systems for potential weaknesses. As with any crowdsourcing effort, a bug bounty program is seen as a way to give an organization quick access to the energy and talents of outside enthusiasts—people who otherwise might never work on government programs in
any formal way.
It’s also a matter of quantity. The more people involved in seeking out vulnerabilities, the more likely such vulnerabilities
will be found. The Pentagon, Army, and Air Force each have run bug bounty programs in the last year. The Air Force took the concept a step further by making it a global effort, inviting participants from Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia.
CYBER WORKFORCE:
LOOKING FOR NEW RECRUITS
Bug bounty programs serve their purpose, but they do nothing to address the larger problem—the
federal government’s perpetual lack of in-house cyber experts. As part of its 2017 high-risk list, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) called for the federal government to step up its efforts to recruit and retain a qualified cybersecurity workforce.
Rep. Will Hurd (R-Texas), chair of the House Oversight Subcommittee on Information Technology, has an idea of how to do this. Instead of hiring cyber experts for permanent positions, he suggests creating a cyber national guard who could serve both the public and private sectors on a rotational basis.
Hurd, along with Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.), first pitched this idea at the 2016 SXSW Interactive Festival. He brought it up again at a hearing in June.
INFORMATION SHARING:
CLEARING OUT THE CHANNELS
This is a perennial question—when the federal government discovers vulnerabilities in popular IT
products, should it share that information with the private sector? On the one hand, federal officials acknowledge the value of exchanging intelligence with the private sector. On the other hand, they also see the value of classifying that information, with hopes of keeping it out of the wrong hands.
At a June 15 congressional hearing, former U.S. Chief Information Security Officer Gregory Touhill stated the government’s “over-classification” of cyber intelligence was the single biggest obstacle to information sharing between the public and private sectors. Such collaboration is seen by Touhill and other cyber experts as key to responding to zero-day events, such as the recent WannaCry ransomware event.
CYBER SHARED SERVICES:
NO NEED TO GO IT ALONE
In the months leading up to the executive order on cybersecurity, federal cyber experts were intrigued by
one particular provision being floated—a shared services approach to cybersecurity. The federal government has been pushing the concept of shared services for years, encouraging agencies to share the cost of developing and managing common business functions; such as financial management, human resource management, and acquisition.
The final executive order ups the ante, directing agencies to “show preference in their procurement for shared IT services,” particularly when it comes to email, cloud, and cybersecurity. Trump administration officials believe that the shared services model could be a boon for smaller agencies lacking the budget and workforce needed to develop and maintain adequate cyber defenses.
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